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Independent and Popular? 




According to Google, in 2015 the most popular YouTube video in the Russian Federation was a clip 
entitled ‘Winnie the Pooh and the Bees’. (Allok & Anfilova 2015).1 It received over 28 million views; however it 
did not feature the characters from the famous children’s book. Instead the video features a group of teenage 
girls, dressed in black-and-orange-striped leotards, performing a sexually-charged twerk dance at the seasonal 
show of the local dance school ‘Kredo’ in Orenburg. The video was uploaded on 12 April 2015 by an 
anonymous user and the footage was taken by a member of the audience on a digital camera or personal 
mobile phone. In less than two weeks, this video was followed by another viral video featuring a twerk by 
Russian dancers who chose the World War II memorial Malaia Zemlia in the city of Novorossiisk as the 
backdrop for their performance. Both videos caused a heated public discussion about female behaviour and 
adolescent education; at the same time they placed the dance style which is extremely fashionable among 
Russian youth at the centre of this public discussion. Simultaneously, the videos became breaking news in 
international media who focussed on the penalties imposed on the dance schools and dancers involved. The 
school in Orenburg was temporarily closed, twerk classes removed from the schedule and a criminal 
investigation opened with charges of indecent exposure of underage children. Charges of hooliganism were 
brought against the young women from Novorossiisk and two of them were jailed for 10–15 days. 
The topic of online videos and youth popular culture opens up a possibility for the re-examination of 
cultural globalisation as a mediated everyday practice (e.g. Christensen et al. 2011: 3-4). The twerk scandal 
foregrounds the kind of cultural consumption of mobile technology that takes place on the periphery of 
cultural production, away from the production centres of international popular culture, but which is 
transmitted through global channels of communication, namely YouTube, potentially to a global audience. 
When these types of videos travel from everyday cultural production and consumption into a wider national 
and international realm, they strike a nerve that is important to that particular time and place in history. Viral 
YouTube videos are highly ephemeral phenomena but at the same time they have the ability to reveal cultural 
practices and discursive formations of a more lasting character. The twerk scandal here is an example of a 
gendered ‘moral panic’ caused by the representation of young female sexuality and the assumed unregulated 
use of different cultural codes and communication technologies (see, Renold & Ringrose 2013; Ringrose et al. 
2013). Therefore, the twerk scandal, as an example of global cultural phenomenon which has local origins, 
invites a gender sensitive perspective on the analysis of popular culture and globalisation in Russia which at the 
same time is relevant to other contexts. For instance, Emma Renold and Jessica Ringrose note that ‘the ways in 
which the girl figure continues to be colonized, exploited, abused and commodified have perhaps intensified’ in 
the global cultural market while there is ‘little analysis of how girls themselves make meaning and negotiate 
the media in their everyday lives’ (2013: 248-9).   
My objective is to discuss young women’s agency in cultural globalisation as it has emerged in the 
process of production and perception of internet videos in contemporary Russia. Both national and 
international media attention to the twerk videos has reinforced the media stereotype of Russian women as 
being subjected to a patriarchal, punishing state’s cultural, political and reproductive pressures, placing these 
stereotypes on the arena of global information streams and feedback loops. The fact that both videos emerged 
from Russian provinces further emphasizes the marginal position of these dancing young women in relation to 
the centres of discursive and cultural power. At the same time, the twerk case affirms the fact that there are 
young Russian women who actively and independently produce online content from the standpoint of their 
own motivations and cultural knowledge. For example, the video shot in Novorossiisk was initially produced as 
promotional material for the dance school in which some of the women performing on the video work as 
dance teachers.  
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The twerk case also shows that the exchange of opinions around viral videos usually presents almost 
exclusively the point of view of everyone else but the performers themselves. Therefore, the gender sensitive 
approach to online video culture encourages me to widen the scope of existing research by exploring some 
lesser-known productions and search for those avenues of information sharing where alternative 
interpretations can be accessed more effectively. This research context, I assert, opens up a new perspective 
for the scrutiny of the centre-periphery dynamics of online popular culture. It helps to unpack the widespread 
practice by established media of utilizing user-generated internet content to create news stories on timely 
issues. It also allows me to suggest that memes and other online genres can be removed from their original 
context of global popular culture in order to downplay the seriousness of social problems evoked in these 
products.  
My major argument concerning the centre-periphery dynamics of globalisation is that cultural 
globalisation has emphasised the role of the Russian public as consumers and users of new, internationally 
expanding media platforms and technologies. I maintain that an important factor in this development has been 
the arrival of global entertainment television on Russian state channels in the early 1990s, particularly the 
international-format series, which quickly became extremely popular (see, for example, Borenstein 2008). 
Albert Moran defines television formats as ‘a cultural technology which governs the flow of program ideas 
across time and space’ (2004: 266). In this chapter, by examining a number of Russian online communication 
networks, I wish to highlight the practice of cultural borrowing and re-contextualization of international 
format-based popular culture. How can we account for certain internet phenomena through formatted popular 
culture? How do formats as important technologies of global popular culture govern the flow of cultural ideas 
in the multidimensional environment of internet communication?  
The Russian-speaking internet—the Runet—has evolved into one of the most powerful segments of 
the world wide web (see, for example, Gorham, Lunde & Paulsen 2014). By the gradual legitimization of the 
internet as an important cultural form of the ‘computer era’, online social networks, where much of the user-
generated content is distributed, are now regarded by many scholars as the ‘natural habitat’, especially of 
young ‘diginatives’. For example, Henry Jenkins has argued that in the age of digital communication there is ‘an 
increased centrality of teens and youth to the global circulation of media’ (2006b: 154). Previous research on 
Russian digital culture has addressed the importance of user-generated content for such global youth cultural 
phenomena as Harry Potter fan fiction (Samutina 2013) and performative political protest in the post-
broadcast era (Strukov 2013). However, the Russophone internet has not yet been thoroughly analysed from 
the perspective of content sharing as an everyday practice which produces conflicting media realities and sites 
of agency.  
Unlike other scholars who have concentrated on audience activity and amateur online media on the 
Runet (see, for example, Chapman 2014; Samutina 2013; Strukov 2013;), I do not self-evidently regard these 
practices as sites of subversion which aim to challenge the existing power structure. Instead, I am interested in 
investigating the ways in which globalized forms of popular culture are used in the negotiations of youth and 
female agency on different levels of Russian online communication. Correspondingly, my aim is to discuss 
cultural globalisation in light of different types of media phenomena that originate in amateur and/or semi-
professional video productions produced as part of Russian youth’s everyday popular culture. I enquire about 
the kinds of cultural agency which are retrieved from global cultural models and about how international 
cultural models are perceived and circulated in the Russian digital media environment.   
 
2. Data and methods 
My analysis focuses on two case studies. The first is the twerk controversy. More specifically, I 
investigate how the scandal figured in the accumulating newsfeeds of digital media, how amateur culture 
emerges in digital newsfeeds, and how twerk is defined in relation to global television and youth culture. The 
second case study analyses one of the most successful but less-known Russian amateur video productions, the 
drama series Stervochki [The Little Bitches] which was created by a group of high-school students from the 
provincial town of Pervoural’sk. The word ‘stervochki’ is the plural diminutive form of ‘sterva’, which loosely 
translates as ‘a bitch’ or ‘a shrew’ and is often used derogatively to refer to an assertive and manipulative 
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female. This type of female agency emerged in Russian popular culture in the 1990s and has become a 
hyperbolic manifestation of a ‘new’ female type, a symbolic practice for unpacking the late-Soviet gender order 
in the new social and economic setting of post-Soviet capitalism (Salmenniemi & Ratilainen 2014). On the one 
hand, ‘sterva’ serves as a pejorative representation of a ‘westernized’ woman who enslaves men sexually (à la 
Samantha Jones from Sex and the City played by Kim Cattrall).2 On the other, ‘sterva’ presents a mixture of 
post-feminist gender ideology and glamour culture thereby capturing post-Soviet consumer and class fantasies 
(Salmenniemi & Ratilainen 2014): a female type who is supposed to be active and independent but who uses 
her sexual appeal in order to climb the social ladder.3   
My research materials comprise various information streams published on the micro blogging platform 
Twitter, on the image and video sharing platform Instagram and on VKontakte, which is the most popular social 
media platform among Russian-speaking internet users. These streams can be divided into three different sets 
of data. Firstly, I analyse internet media content and user comments shared on Twitter with the Cyrillic 
hashtags ‘twerk’ and ‘twerking’ (from April through December 2015). Secondly, I analyse the information 
streams marked with the Cyrillic hashtag ‘stervochki’, which are found both on Twitter and on Instagram (ca. 
500 Instagram posts and tweets). Finally, my research data includes Stervochki’s fan profile on VKontakte. With 
nearly 30,000 followers, this site represents a medium sized online fan community. Somewhat similar but more 
popular fan profiles on Vkontakte are, for instance, the site for Russian-speaking Harry Potter fans with ca. 
463,000 followers and the fan profile of the Norwegian youth series Skam [Shame] with ca. 232,000 followers. 
My estimation is, however, that in the context of currently ongoing, non-commercial and independent DIY 
productions, Stervochki’s fan base is one of the largest in Russia. Together, these social media gather, organise 
and store publications produced by different types of news outlets (national, regional and local) and different 
types of contributors (professional journalists, bloggers and citizen commentators). This multifaceted set of 
research materials allows me to examine a wide range of information channels which supply diverse 
publications from multiple sources which are organised into streams and are then appropriated for different 
discursive and creative uses.     
I employ qualitative analysis of selected digital media content in order to map different information 
flows on the Runet and to reveal different contextualisation strategies (Jenkins 2006b: 152). My analysis draws 
on the research of Russian televisual culture and the so-called do-it-yourself (DIY) production of culture which 
has become more mainstream with the evolvement of web 2.0 and mobile technologies (Ratto & Boler 2014: 
3). I maintain that online distribution of amateur cultural productions has reshaped the forms of interaction 
between global cultural streams and local audiences within the ‘post-broadcast’ and ‘networked’ media 
environment (Castells 2011; Prior 2006). This means that global popular culture, facilitated by international 
commercial conglomerates, is perceived on the local level and re-distributed through online networks to new 
audiences. In this process, global images and meanings are ‘de-contextualised and re-contextualised at the 
sites of consumption’ (Jenkins 2006b: 154). With this approach I follow Henry Jenkins’s argumentation, as he 
writes that ‘the new information space [of the digital age] involves multiple and unstable forms of re-
contextualization’ (2006b: 140) emerging with the increased grass-roots audience participation in the 
production and evaluation of cultural knowledge.  
 I begin my discussion with an overview of post-Soviet media convergence which serves as an important 
analytical framework for my analysis. In this section, I also review the term ‘user-generated content’ in light of 
my case studies. I then proceed to analyse the patriotic re-contextualisation of twerk as a means for discursive 
marginalization of female cultural agency. In the last section, I discuss the amateur online series Stervochki as 
an example of renegotiations of popular culture’s gender stereotyping, youth cultural agency and global 
identity building, before moving to conclusions. 
 
3. Networked media and changing television culture in Russia 
 
The cases in question have occurred at the intersection of different media channels, or what has been 
labelled as media convergence and is characteristic of digital communicative environment. Henry Jenkins views 
media convergence not only as a technological process but also ‘a paradigm shift across multiple media 
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channels, toward the increased interdependence of communication systems, toward multiple ways of 
accessing media content, and towards ever more complex relations between top-down corporate media and 
bottom-up participatory culture’ (2006a: 243). I consider the interaction and interdependence between 
television and internet, especially in its social media, or ‘web 2.0’ phase, as the most crucial point of media 
convergence that offers insights into several tensions in the contemporary Russian cultural field. Here 
televisual popular culture continues to function as a significant cultural background while the internet 
represents the ongoing global change of mass communication and the newest media technology which is 
particularly appealing to the younger generation of media users. The interaction between global cultural 
streams and local audiences, however, had been developing for a long time through the international trade of 
format licenses, particularly central to entertainment television (Moran 2004). As related to post-Soviet Russia, 
international formats represent the transformation of televisual culture that took root in perestroika reforms 
and culminated in the 1990s – a process which includes such changes as the abolishment of censorship, 
privatisation of media ownership and westernisation of popular culture. Format-based programming continues 
to be the dominant form of television content also in the 2000s. Several scholars argue that international 
formats have changed the Russian audience’s expectations concerning televisual programming (Prokhorova 
2010; Hutchings & Rulyova 2009; Heller 2003). Moreover, global television programmes have introduced a new 
national grand narrative ‘between the past of the chaotic 1990s and the more glorious future’ which has been 
particularly important to Putin’s presidency (Klioutchkine 2005). In this chapter I scrutinise formatted television 
in the new context of networked online communication and DIY-youth culture. 
Russian televisual culture in the internet age is a good example of the simultaneous centripetal and 
centrifugal tendencies of cultural change. As the dominant mass medium and, as some critics claim, the most 
trusted source of information among certain types of audiences in Russia, television represents everyday life 
and social stability (Hutchings & Tolz 2015). At the same time, the national television infrastructure is 
undergoing a fundamental reform in response to the global ‘digital revolution’ of communication (Strukov & 
Zvereva 2014; Vyrkovski & Makeenko 2014). For example, Elena Vartanova remarks that as the internet 
currently offers the most important distribution channel for new televisual content, the types of global 
programming strategies which are not tied to a certain television channel but to a digital database, become 
increasingly important to media producers (2014: 19).  
On the one hand, the broadcasting structure of Russian national television has become increasingly 
centralized in the 2000s. This means that local television channels have suffered from resource cuts and 
become increasingly dependent on the Moscow-based national television and radio company All-Russia State 
Television and Radio Broadcasting Company4 (Hutchings & Rulyova 2009; Strukov & Zvereva 2014). On the 
other, the internet has given birth to a great number of independent television networks such as TV Rain. In 
addition, Russian television currently exists within the ‘global info-sphere’, in which international channels and 
global networks are available through cable, satellite and on the internet (Hutchings & Rulyova 2009: 3, 11; 
Strukov & Zvereva 2014). This means that changing technology and overlapping telecommunication services 
characterize the television consumption of the internet age as, for example, Stanislav Kholkin, general producer 
of the local ETV channel in Yekaterinburg puts it: ‘at the end of the single cord, you have your cable television, 
internet and telephone’ (Strukov 2014: 302). We can continue his idea by saying that it is important to have 
also the tools for creating and distributing new media content at the end of the ‘single cord’ on the same 
device. It is well-known that smart phones and tablet computers enable their users to record texts, images and 
audio as well as to edit and to share self-made content with others through the internet. In Russia, as in other 
developed countries, this type of content has long exceeded the content produced under the auspices of the 
state.  
It has been argued that in the age of media convergence, people consume, produce and distribute 
media with personal technology in a variety of individualized ways (e.g. Jenkins 2006a). The simultaneity and 
interconnectedness of media producers and media users through personal technology has also urged media 
scholars to reconceptualise the very notion of audience by breaking it into different categories depending on 
the type of internet activity. In the current media environment, digital content can be divided into:  
(a) edited content, mainly produced by traditional media and established media outlets;  
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(b) user-generated content, produced by individuals the majority of whom are not affiliated with any 
media outlet;  
(c) the bulk of information streams on the internet which consists of edited content, shared on social 
media platforms as user-distributed content; and  
(d) people who engage with digital media in a particularly active manner by commenting on edited 
materials or even re-modelling the existing content for their own use, i.e. co-producers or prosumers 
(Rajagopalan 2013; Matikainen & Villi 2015).  
User-distribution and prosumption of digital media bring together different and sometimes conflicting 
topics and opinions on a single platform. Both edited and user-generated content combine and create 
information streams marked with key words, or hashtags. This means that digital media which exist as a type of 
database are in the constant process of reconstruction and reorganisation into new information streams 
according to the ‘logic of the algorithm’ (Manovich 2002: 222). However, it is not only the programmed 
algorithm of the service provider but also the amount and volume of user participation on a specific online 
platform that determine the informational weight and visibility of an individual publication. For example, by 
following the information streams on Twitter, marked with the Cyrillic hashtag ‘twerk’ during my research 
period in 2015, one cannot help noticing that the discussion on this topic in Russian online media is mainly 
concentrated around a few topics. They include different new dance trends and the role of dance in Russian 
culture and society, youth education in the fields of extracurricular activities and schooling, and national issues 
of moral politics, of which the latter is the most prominent.   
Another form of prosumption of digital media is the activity of online fan communities, in which (a) 
people use media content as raw material for their own creative work; (b) media consumption involves 
significant emotional investments; and (c) interaction with other consumers of the same media plays an 
important role (see Wilson 2011; Jenkins 2006a & 2006b). Although fan communities constitute a small 
minority of all internet users, their interactive relationship with media based on ‘collective intelligence’ (Levy 
1994 ctd in Jenkins 2006a) and peer support may signal a larger-scale media change in the Russian Federation 
and elsewhere. For example, in the introduction to their edited volume Vlad Strukov and Vera Zvereva outline 
socio-cultural consequences of digitization of television and note that ‘[b]y the increase of real competition, 
television producers treat the viewer as an equal and make programmes as if “for themselves”’ (2014, xxxv).  
The information streams around Stervochki are based on this type of prosumption. The online activity 
of both the producers and viewers of the series creates an ‘interpretive community’, a context and strategy for 
preserving and maintaining a common cultural resource which is shared in digital communication environment 
(see Fish 1984: 14). Digital media become an everyday social practice through which people create and 
reproduce different cultural readings in an interactive, playful and creative process (de Certeau 1984; Jenkins 
2006b). For example, the viewers of Stervochki contribute to the online fan community by sharing lines from 
the series as text comments, circulating screenshots and video clips and creating their own fan art collages. In 
this process of fan-based recreating of the series on social networking sites, certain scenes, characters and 




IMAGE 1. Collection of Stervochki posters and fan art on the Vkontakte page of the series. Visual 
  participation is an important part of fan activity. Source: https://vk.com/stervochki_tv. 
 
4. The patriotic re-contextualization of twerk 
 
 
The word ‘twerk’ was included in the Oxford Dictionary in June 2015: a twerk is a ‘[d]ance to popular music in a 
sexually provocative manner involving thrusting hip movements and a low, squatting stance’ (Oxford 
Dictionaries). Internationally, twerk was adopted from African American5 hip-hop and street social dance 
subculture to mainstream music television and videos and eventually found its way to training programmes in 
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local gyms and dance schools all over the world. In previous scholarship it is commonly mentioned that 
twerking was brought into mainstream by the U.S. teen idol Miley Cyrys who adopted twerking to be an 
important part of her image transformation from a Disney child actor into a sexually matured pop artist (Gaunt 
2015). She performed twerk at the MTV VMAs in August 2013, which led to an internet sensation and 
prompted a lot of scandalous media discourse around different meanings of her act. Relative to hip hop and 
American music video industry, twerking is connected to hyper-sexualized representations of black women’s 
bodies and therefore Cyrus and other white stars who show twerking as a way to their sexual empowerment 
have propelled critical commentary on cultural appropriation and ‘white consumption of black sexuality’ in 
popular culture (Campbell 2004, hooks 1992). In this context, it is the lack of a relationship with the black 
community which marks Cyrus’s and others’ twerk performances as cultural appropriation. With new digital 
technologies and distribution channels cultural practices that come from a background of complicated race and 
sexual politics are easily replicated and adopted uncritically and ahistorically to new contexts (Baskerwille 
2014, Campbell 2004). This can be the case with the global circulation of twerk videos and it needs further 
research in a transnational setting.6  
Twitter and Instagram show that Russia is part of the global twerking trend, with many dancers and 
dance teachers sharing snapshots of their everyday twerk practice. In the context of Russian canonical 
understanding of culture twerk represents an exotic ‘other’ as for a long time only classical genres such as 
ballet, folk dance and ballroom dance were included in the state cultural system. Against this backdrop, it is not 
surprising that in the number of news stories from the federal and local press commenting on the events in 
Orenburg and Novorossiisk and shared by Russian Twitter users, twerk is above all labelled as a ‘scandalous’ 
and ‘provocative’ dance (e.g. Makarsky 2015). By way of its rising fame in both international and national 
cultural spheres, as the popular lifestyle magazine Afisha writes, ‘twerk has become the most popular dance in 
Russia’ (Makarsky 2015). I argue that the Orenburg twerk performance and to some extent the other 
‘scandalous’ twerk videos by Russian dancers follow the example of the international, professionally produced 
media precedent by offering their locally produced amateur or semi-professional interpretations. My case also 
shows that in the digital age local productions have a chance to emerge as a global phenomenon with millions 
of views in just a few days. This is due to the feedback loop between Cyrus’s performance at the annual MTV 
gala and its glocalised version at the final concert of a Russian provincial dance school, which suggests that 
Russian (digital) culture is fully connected to the global one.7 
In the Orenburg case, charges against the dancers were eventually dropped as the investigation 
committee announced that it had not found any proof of illegal preparation of indecent materials displaying 
underage children. During the process, the committee had consulted with professional choreographers who 
confirmed that all dance moves in the act were in line with the moves of ‘the international twerk style’ and 
therefore they must not be seen as including any pornographic or erotic elements. It is interesting to notice 
how global aesthetics is used here to defend local transgressors against accusations of public display of 
sexuality.  
The state interventions did not prevent new twerk scandals from emerging. By the end of 2015, several 
other twerk videos of and by young women recorded at iconic locations and shared through social networking 
sites became hot topics in Russian media. These include, for example, videos showing twerk dances in Red 
Square in Moscow, in front of the Russian Bridge [Russkii most] in Vladivostok, and at another World War II 
memorial in the small city of Potchep in the Briansk district. In addition, it is worth mentioning that among the 
twerk videos discussed by Russian media through the discourse of scandal was one produced by young male 
cadets, also from Novorossiisk. They performed a twerk-like-dance in front of a T-34 tank while pretending to 
be washing it, wearing only underwear. Although the video had been uploaded on YouTube already in 2011, 
the local prosecutor started to investigate it in May 2015, only after it was associated with the other, more 
recent twerk cases (Bortnikov 2015; Life #novosti 2015). When reporting on these events, different federal and 
local news outlets articulated quite consistently that national monuments are not suitable backgrounds for this 
‘unusual’ [neobychnyi] and ‘explicit’ [otkrovennyi] dance, and that those who make the videos apparently lack 
patriotic education (Federal press 2015; Zvezda 2015). In other words, the state administration’s initial critical 
response to the twerk video had an impact on how subsequent Russian media discourse was structured. For 
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example, according to Sergei Ivanov, who worked as the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration at the 
time of the scandals, performing a twerk in front of a war memorial is to be seen as ‘improper and unethical’ 




IMAGE 2.  Screengrab of a news article published on the regional news site Nasha Gazeta 
Yekaterinburg  [Our newspaper Yekaterinburg] 25 May 2015 about a twerk performance at the monumental 
Russian  Bridge in Vladivostok. The bridge was built in preparation for the Asian-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation  (APEC) conference held in Vladivostok 2012. Source: ngzt.ru. 
 
 
At the same time, this negative discourse drew media attention to local dance schools. For example, on 
5 May 2015, the online newsletter In-the-Know [V-kurse] in the Perm’ district published a short article 
summarizing the ongoing twerk scandal and also advertising twerk lessons for those aged eighteen and older at 
a local dance school (V-kurse 2015). This news article rehearses the official stance by referring to twerk as 
‘scandalous’, however it ends with a more balanced statement: ‘twerk is based on traditional African 
movements, which concentrate first and foremost on the buttocks, hips and stomach’ (V-kurse 2015). This 
definition, re-contextualising twerk as having ‘traditional African movements’ and adding a further technical 
description, allows for a different approach and implicitly places twerk in the framework of transnational 
cultural models, techniques and formats.  
The Orenburg performance should thus be considered from the perspective of international television 
and cultural formats, which combine global models with locally established cultural symbols and frames of 
interpretation. However, with the Orenburg video, this glocal re-contextualisation caused a lot of confusion 
among a number of media commentators. For example, the dancers’ routine alluded to Winnie the Pooh and 
their costumes—black and orange leotards—evoked the ribbon of Saint George which has been used under 
Putin as a symbol of state patriotism. The show took place on the stage of the local Palace of Culture which is 
an institution established under Stalin for the support of workers’ recreation and education.8 For example, a 
host of the online talk-show #heshteg, on the Tiumen-based media outlet Vsluh.ru, remarks that the venue and 
the presence of friends and parents ‘create a sense of permissiveness (…) as if this is how it should be’9 
(Vsluh.tv 2015). The implicit message of this statement is that there is a cultural mismatch between the twerk 
performed by the young girls on the Orenburg stage and the twerk perceived by media commentators. It 
seems like the local, familiarized and historically significant setting of the House of Culture as the context of 
audience reception overshadows the number of elements taken from the global context of international 
television and dance culture, which apparently was the context in which this performance was initially created. 
This might also be the reason why the importance of international television and video sharing culture for the 
everyday life of the Russian youth was by and large left out of view when presenting the twerk cases in media. 
In the above quote, the talk show host suggests that the familiar surroundings can potentially generate overly 
approving interpretations of twerk dancing. However, the majority of media comments with a disproportioned 
focus on the symbols and meanings deriving from the national cultural context and the simultaneous dispelling 
of the global context help reproduce a judgmental attitude towards twerk.  
The difference is apparent in how the performances have been interpreted by the state officials which 
reveals the conservative turn in Russian politics and social life with its emphasis on state-funded patriotism. 
That year, 2015, the Russian Federation celebrated an important historical event—the 70th anniversary of the 
Soviet Victory in the Great Patriotic War, which is seen as a distinct part of World War II. In the same year the 
Russian administration also celebrated the anniversary of a more recent geopolitical ‘achievement’—the 
‘incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation’, which is the official Russian label for the annexation of 
Crimea. It is possible that those who made and published the videos did not intend them to be political 
provocations; however, in the context of the existing cultural, political and military hegemony they were 
interpreted as contravening the official stance. The fact that they instantly became extremely popular with 
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Runet users suggests that the users responded to their transgressive nature. In other words, some of the twerk 
dancers were ‘poaching’ (de Certeau 1988) on the patriotic media discourse when making videos against the 
backdrop of local war memorials and other national monuments. These easily recognizable and symbolically 
charged backdrops anchor the videos to the dominant media discourse at once distinguishing them from the 
number of other DIY dance videos taped in the everyday context of bedrooms, gyms and dance studios. 
Similarly, by describing the young women as ‘immoral and dissolute’, media commentators ‘poached’ on the 
already-existing scandalous currency of twerk which provided media outlets with a much desired visibility in 
online newsfeeds. 
The twerk scandal demonstrates the politicization of Russian popular culture/discourse at various 
levels of production and consumption of media. By linking the Orenburg twerk to Pussy Riot’s performance in 
the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, some social media commentators suggested that the videos should be 
viewed as a protest and provocation in spite of the fact that none of the videos contains any explicit anti-
government messages. For example, a Twitter user draws together the discussions around twerk in December 
2015: ‘Looks like the highest form of youth protest in Russian Federation is #twerk, preferably at a war 
memorial. Yes! Go on in the same spirit!’ (Twitter, 9.12.2015). The paranoid politicisation of Russian culture 
was evident in some conspiracy theories. In both edited (e.g. the tabloid Komsomolskaia Pravda) and user-
generated media (e.g. LiveJournal) there have been speculations that the Orenburg video was deliberately 
uploaded as an anti-Russian provocation by an anonymous user less than a month before the Victory Day 
celebration in May. These media outlets supplied digital traces—who shared video, when and how—to develop 
their conspiracy theories: they claimed that the opposition leader and political blogger Aleksei Navalnyi was 
one of the first people to share the video on Twitter and therefore the Orenburg video was an anti-government 
statement.  
In this process of re-contextualization of twerk within politicized and patriotic discourse, young women 
are positioned as dependent on professionals in the education sector—the local school and centres for extra-
curricular activities—as well as on the ‘uncontrollable’ forces of global popular culture. Some media outlets 
claimed that there was ‘total anarchy’ in the area of children’s extracurricular education and an ‘incompetent 
manner of introducing children to new material’, which has eventually resulted in a ‘low-quality performance’ 
and ‘faux pas costume choice’ (MariMedia 2015). Consequently, the young women in the twerk videos were 
perceived as being separate from the messages delivered by audio-visual online interpretations of their 
performance. In conclusion, the news media discourse circulating through content-sharing platforms points to 
the lack of structure and state control as one of the most significant reasons behind the emergence of the 
scandalous twerk performances. Simultaneously, it understates the link between cultural adaptation of music 
video programmes to the curricula of local dance schools, commodification of patriotic symbols, and the 
widespread everyday practice of posting self-made videos on social networking sites. In this discourse the 
adaptation of international models is not perceived as a creative process or part of Russian youth culture and 
those who do it—here the young girls—are, through an aggressive process of de-contextualization and re-
contextualization, discursively deprived of agency. 
 
5. Amateur series Stervochki and prosumption of global television 
 
The amateur television series Stervochki exemplifies how adapting global television culture in amateur 
videos can bring local-level success and reinforce youth agency in the networked digital media environment. In 
2011 film director Il’ia Vershchagin was seventeen years old when he and his friends started to make Stervochki 
without any budget or special equipment. Vershchagin’s friends, who also had no previous experience in 
making videos, play all characters in the series. At first, the series was shot with a mobile phone but it was 
replaced eventually with a high-definition digital camera. Over the course of the project, the quality of image 
and sound improved significantly with an almost professional standard of production in the latest season. In 
addition to the series, the Stervochki crew launched a full-length film The Bitches: the Lady’s Secret [Stervochki: 
Taina ledi] in 2014. So far four full seasons of Stervochki have been produced: they contain forty 10–20 minute-
long episodes; and the fifth season is currently in the making. The most popular episodes have between 
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200,000 and 450,000 views and the total number of views on the series’ YouTube channel is almost four million 
(as of September 2016).10 During seasons, new episodes appear once a week, usually on Saturdays, and the last 
episode of each season has premiered at special screenings in local film theatres in Yekaterinburg, St. 
Petersburg, Moscow and several other Russian cities.  
Any delays in the release of new episodes are actively discussed on social media by the series fans. Fan 
activity is an important part of the production because the producers use crowd sourcing to create and fund 
the project. For example, when they work on the script they ask fans to contribute their ideas on how to 
develop the storyline and sometimes even ask help with finding certain locations and props for specific scenes. 
These inquiries have produced a large number of texts available online that can be classified as fan fiction (see 
Samutina 2013). In addition, these exchanges create a strong sense of community and co-creativity among the 
viewers /fans. One fan, for example comments: ‘The second season… guys, do you feel how they really listened 
to our suggestions? As a result, we are writing the new screenplay for our favourite series together with the 
director. As we requested, there is more bitching [stervoznost’], drugs, complex intrigues and daunting criminal 
episodes’ (VKontakte, 2 Nov 2011).   
Stervochki’s plotline adheres closely to the conventions of American and Latin American daytime 
television soap opera that became extremely popular on Russian television in the 1990s and early 2000s. The 
main storyline depicts the adventures of three young female swindlers, Liza, Marina and Kira, whose goal in life 
is to achieve a glamorous lifestyle by any means. Glamour consumption thematically frames the whole series 
and features as its central ideology. This is expressed through the opening theme, the pop song entitled 
‘Beauty’ [Krasota] by Nastenka Ovchinnikova. The lyrics include the phrase ‘blonde girls walk on streets made 
of diamonds/ crystals shine in their hair/ like on the covers of magazines like in images’, and continues, ‘they 
know, you have all become glamorous’.11 Despite its almost non-existent budget, Stervochki conveys a 
distanced or even abstract representation of glamorous Russia, which connects to the mainstream popular 
media mainly through several ‘symbolic cues’ (Bormann 1985), that is, references to well-known themes and 
motifs of other representations of glamour in Russian popular culture. For instance, the series is filmed in 
shabby 1960s apartment buildings, and it shows muddy courtyards and grey streets of provincial Russia but 
between scenes, the camera often focuses on the Sberbank office building in the centre of Pervoural’sk in 
order to emphasise the power of money in the lives of the heroes. Furthermore, the actors’ clothes and 
makeup have not been provided by expensive designer brands but at the same time the characters are 
repetitiously involved in conspicuous consumption. They, for example, drink Chateau Cheval Blanc, order 
cheesecake through home delivery and book trips to exotic tourist resorts. With the help of these repetitive 
elements, the viewers are obliged to co-create an impression of global glamour and luxury lifestyle in their own 
minds, relying on their previous cultural knowledge of glamour as ‘byproduct of consumption culture (…) 
manifested in the availability of products imported from abroad’ (Goscilo & Strukov 2010: 2, 6).12 
The overt gender stereotyping suggested in the series title creates an important ‘horizon of 
expectation’ (Jauss 1982) as the producers of Stervochki utilize the post-feminist stereotype as a starting point. 
The storyline and the fans’ ideas for future episodes reveal a feminized form of Machiavellianism, that is, an 
imaginative way of manipulating others by using intimate (sexual) relations for personal gain. Moreover, I 
argue that ‘stervoznost’’ as one of the core themes of the series pinpoints the importance of popular culture. 
Stervochki thus shows how young people are socialized into their future roles as citizens of the Russian 
Federation working in a global context, that is, in how they constitute ‘a self from overlapping, sometimes 
contradictory possibilities’ and symbolic resources (Bloustien 2003: 250). Gerry Bloustien notes that in youth 
everyday life, the ‘engagement with popular culture (…), is a complex dialectic activity, one that oscillates 
repeatedly between total engagement and a balancing, knowing distanciation’ (2003: 34). Following this idea, I 
propose that the female hero of the series—sterva—is a rough approximation of what mainstream television 
drama in particular and popular imagery in general offer to post-Soviet cultural youth consumers today.  
The amateur video series and especially the fans’ demands for even more outrageous plotlines than 
they’ve previously seen speaks for Russian young internet users’ willingness to challenge and extend the 
symbolic boundaries of the existing cultural reserve (Bloustien 2003: 35). The fan interaction on social media 
further shows that the symbolic boundaries of Stervochki are extended beyond gender stereotypes and into 
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areas that emphasize the online audiences’, that is, prosumers’, agency as related to global consumption and 
online video culture.    
 
IMAGE 3.  A banner advertising Stervochki’s fourth season published on the Vkontakte page of the 
 series. The text at the bottom says ‘Night is the time of secrets’. Source: https://vk.com/stervochki_tv. 
 
The amateur quality thereby invites the viewer to imagine and participate. This happens in various 
ways, and sometimes the fans wish to describe their viewer’s experience by pointing to the lack of actual 
glamour in the series. A Twitter user, for example, comments: ‘Today I am going to dive deep into the world of 
provincial glamour, filled with violence and fraud’ (Twitter, 31 December 2013) while another commentator 
remarks: ‘A chick walks along the streets of Shit-ville [Mukhosransk] in high heels to awesome music’ (Twitter, 
29 July 2013). These comments obviously emphasise the steep contrast which exists between the implied 
glamour (epitomized by the diamond-covered streets of the theme song) and the actual environment that 
appears in the series footage.  
Thus the fans use the series to reflect on themselves, the reality of glamour consumption and 
community in their own lives. On Twitter and especially on the image-sharing platform Instagram, which are 
often hyperlinked, the members of the Stervochki fan community actively and creatively interact with the 
series producers and among themselves by posting written comments, photographs, video clips, fan art 
collages, all marked by hashtags. The online activity of the fans usually takes place while watching the series at 
home or waiting for another episode to appear. Consequently, the overall representation of the fan community 
can be characterised through an accentuated description of everyday life, which obtains meaning especially 
through visual representation of private spaces and activities. However, the series Stervochki is at the centre of 
this imaging and self-imaging: the series appears as the central visual element on television or, more likely, on 
the computer screen and the young viewers and their private spaces develop around it. Mobile technology 
makes this space flexibly available for media use, as the computer is located in the living room, in the kitchen, 
on the table, or in one’s bedroom.  
Media technology also makes the domestic everyday space a performative space. Stervochki’s fans use 
this space as a canvas on which they project mainly two kinds of self-images. Firstly, either fragmented or 
whole self-portraits (selfies) showing a cheerful, supportive and even affectionate attitude towards the series 
(thumbs up, for example). Secondly, images of everyday items—meals, drinks and branded goods—which are 
arranged in the style of still-life painting and which often allude to the consumption patterns of the characters 
in the series. All these photographs and comments together create a composite image in which affectionate 
everyday media use is combined with the private consumption of everyday food and drink and, more 
importantly, with consumer fantasies, brand consciousness and consumer trends that circulate across post-
Soviet popular media, thus creating an overwhelming collage of contemporaneity.   
These images of affectionate television/video watching merge with various quality evaluations. Quality 
is at once a central and complex category when it comes to amateur productions and the comments by 
Stervochki’s fans express a persisting effort to apply different verbal tools and techniques of evaluating the 
amateur quality of the beloved and community-constituting series. One of these techniques is irony which is 
created by using two opposite registers in one phrase, i.e., by combining a strongly negative expression with a 
superlative qualifier. For example, in the fans’ comments, Stervochki is often called a ‘wild series’ [dikii serial] 
and ‘ingenious crap’ [genial’noe der’mo]. Another popular method of evaluating the series ironically is by using 
exaggerated, hyperbolic expressions, such as ‘the coolest series of all humankind’ [samyi krutoi serial 
chelovechestva]. These types of evaluations seem to appreciate the camp value of the series and they also 
express deeper insights. For instance, one viewer had used screengrabs of his/her mobile phone to share the 
following opinion:  
The series is full of different colours of emotions, 
overflow of passion, mystery and surprises. Each 
episode is like a new glimpse of fresh air. As 
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people cannot live without water, food and 
oxygen, it is equally impossible to live without this 
cult series Stervochki!! The series simply does not 
have any flaws. The screenwriter has meticulously 
thought through every detail and the actors’ work 
is mind-blowing. (Twitter, 4 February 2015)  
 
The comment goes on to describe the feelings that arise upon watching the series, the things it has taught this 
particular viewer and how it can generally make life better. In the end, the commentator points out that thanks 
to the series s/he has developed ‘a sense of beauty, style and taste that corresponds to elite life!’ Although this 
appears ironic due to its hyperbolic use of different expressions, the statement also conveys a genuine feeling 
of exhilaration towards the series and its producers.  
Consequently, the online community of Stervochki expresses both excitement and criticism of the 
series with the help of the ironic double-register. On the one hand, the viewers point out the most obvious 
thing about Stervochki which is its amateur quality and by so doing implicitly compare it to professionally 
produced drama on television and film. On the other, the viewers clearly identify with the producers’ 
enthusiasm to make and distribute homemade videos and admire their courage to expose these videos to the 
uncensored criticism of the online audience. Consequently, instead of evaluating the technological and 
dramaturgical quality of the series, the online community evaluates Stervochki by measuring the degree to 
which they can identify with the producers’ point of view, in other words how well the viewers and fans of the 
series, as ordinary school kids from the Russian provinces, can imagine themselves in the place of the amateur 
actors and screenwriters and self-trained users of digital technology. My analysis shows that the prosumption 
of mobile media is integrated seamlessly within the structures of the everyday life of Stervochki fans. 
Participation in the online sharing of comments and images enables the Stervochki fans a role of an informed 




In this chapter I have presented an analysis of cultural globalisation through the case of Russian online 
amateur videos. I have argued that the internet combines several traditional and new forms of media and 
therefore it is vitally important to take media convergence, multimodal communication and hyperlinked, 
multiplatform publication practices into consideration when examining a Russian perspective on cultural 
globalisation. Commercial television formats, licensed and administrated by big media conglomerates are one 
of the most significant technologies of globalisation, spreading cultural ideas and narratives to new audiences 
all over the world. International format television is an important cultural background for different types of 
youth amateur productions that now circulate on social networking sites in the form of DIY YouTube videos. In 
the age of digital communication, global popular culture is increasingly apt to reach new locations through peer 
communities, moving from one internet user to another. Based on these arguments, my chapter has shown 
how online amateur media gives a new form and meaning to ideas and stories originating in global popular and 
televisual culture in contemporary Russia.  
The selected cases illuminate the role of online popular culture in cultural globalisation simultaneously 
revealing the new realities of cultural production in Russia today. The two cases reveal the technological, social 
and cultural aspects of online communication in the global era. They also indicate the tensions between 
Russian cultural self-perception and global feedback loops seen in the context of digital communication 
infrastructure and popular culture. Although very different from one another, my case studies represent 
different types of online phenomena that are both typical of the current digital age. The twerk case accounts 
for a sudden, fast-evolving and easily-forgotten online scandal which has reached a global audience, caused a 
public outcry and affected those who were directly involved in the performance and the making of the video. 
The second case involves a long-term multimedia project with an emphasis on production and strategic 
distribution to a niche online audience. Twerk dancing, which was originally adapted to youth performances 
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and videos from global television (esp. Miley Cyrus’s VMA performance), is given new meanings through 
patriotic re-contextualisation whereas Stervochki and its fan base create ‘a culture within culture’, an online 
subculture strongly influenced by the patterns of international-format drama series. In other words, the twerk 
scandal is produced and reproduced through the marginalisation of global television and girls’ popular culture 
while Stervochki’s popularity relies on prosumption of the global televisual culture and active negotiation 
between conflicting representations of femininity.  
Consequently, the two cases showcase gender stereotyping in Russian media and culture; they also 
question youth and female agency. My analysis of the twerk scandal demonstrates the marginalization of 
global trends and their influence on Russian culture also easily results in pejorative attitudes to youth everyday 
culture and everyday use of the internet. Instead, twerk has been discursively re-framed within mainstream 
patriotic discourse, and thus young girls performing in the videos were singlehandedly perceived as behaving in 
an ‘unpatriotic’ manner. The media perception of the twerk videos thus confirms the gender polarization of 
Russian public discourse which now extends to the area of online social networks as well. Simultaneously, it 
encourages one to inquire about the role of young women in cultural globalisation outside media scandals.  
 Online participatory culture increases young internet users’ opportunities to develop their media 
literacy in the context of global popular culture. My analysis of Stervochki, which here represents a less well-
known video production, thus diversifies our understanding of online popular culture especially from the 
viewpoint of youth and female agency. In my analysis, I have emphasized how various materials on the series’ 
VKontakte profile open up the production process and make it available for the participation of fans and 
viewers. This has an impact on Stervochki’s overall representation of gender as the young female actors who 
play stereotyped roles of stervas on the videos, actively take part in the writing, producing and promoting of 
the series. Due their status as the main stars of the series, the interaction between the fans and the female 
actors becomes one of the most crucial elements of Stervochki’s fan community. In other words, an online 
drama series that heavily draws on popular cultures’ gender stereotypes provides young girls with agency as 
part of a creative online community. Through its female characters, the series also portrays glamour as an 
important everyday practice thus reflecting contemporary Russia as a society of consumers and a society 
striving to be included in the world economy of symbolic consumption of international brands and brand 
conscious taste.  
 In my analysis of both cases, I have highlighted the importance of an ongoing process of defining 
quality as one of the central markers of any cultural production. Various digital publications and platforms 
analysed in this chapter organize the distribution of information into accumulating, open-ended information 
streams. They enable a number of different frameworks of interpretation to combine and overlap in a more 
fundamental way than before the internet age. The larger questions that remain to be studied more closely 
include the following: Do these frameworks constitute a new ‘grand narrative’ of Russian cultural self-
perception in the era of globalisation? Do the digital media confirm or break the division of a singular Russia 
into ‘multiple Russias’ which exist in parallel, disconnected realities? Digital media can be seen as offering a 
better access to some of these realities but what kind of tools do they offer to gain mutual understanding 
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popular culture. 
7  Twerk appeared not only in small Russian provincial dance studios but also on Russian 
prime time television. At the time when the twerk scandal was at its peak (April-May 2015), the 
show Dance [Tantsy] just finished its first season on the national cable channel TNT. Dance 
belongs to the group of format-based reality talent shows which bring amateur and professional 
dancers from all over Russia to perform in front of a jury of celebrity-choreographers with the 
aim of winning the grand prix of 53,600 $ (three million roubles). The show premiered in August 
2014 and in September 2016 it was already in its third season. The show targets young 
individuals and its entertaining format is open to the sexiest trends in contemporary dance. For 
example, the show’s opening theme includes short excerpts of twerk and pole dance amongst 
other dance styles that the audience may expect to see over the course of the season.  
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8  Since Stalin’s time Palaces of Culture have housed a range of cultural activities from theatre to 
folk concerts to dance performances to literary clubs. Usually built in the ‘imperskii’ style of the Stalin 
era and occupying a central location, they represented the Soviet mass culture and aimed at 
‘stabilising the ideological order’ thorough enlightened leisure (Habeck 2011: 5). To date, local Palaces 
of Culture remain important venues for concerts and performances in both small towns and larger 
cities (Donahoe & Habeck 2011). 
9  [sozdaetsia takoe oshchushchenie dozvolennosti, vrodi by eto tak i dolzhno byt’] 
10  It is likely that Stervochki’s viewership is on the level of popular tv serials broadcast on 
national channels. In early 2000s, the ratings of the most popular tv series, such as Moia 
prekrasnia niania, Ne rodis’ krasivoi and Brigada were as high as in the 30% (Prokhorova 2011). 
In today’s changed media environment, the most popular television programs receive 
significantly lower ratings.  
11  Po dorozhke iz almaza/ khodiat devushki blondinki/ vo volosakh sverkaiut strazy/ kak s 
oblozhki, kak s kartinki/ (…) znaiut, stali vse glamurnymi. 
12  For a more detailed analysis of Stervochki’s content and especially the role of glamour in it, 
see Katila & Ratilainen 2016. 
